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We provide a class of bound entangled states that have positive distillable secure key rate. The
smallest state of this kind is 4⊗ 4, which shows that peculiar security contained in bound entangled
states does not need high dimensional systems. We show, that for these states a positive key rate can
be obtained by one-way Devetak-Winter protocol. Subsequently the volume of bound entangled key-
distillable states in arbitrary dimension is shown to be nonzero. We provide a scheme of verification
of cryptographic quality of experimentally prepared state in terms of local observables. Proposed
set of 7 collective settings is proven to be optimal in number of settings.
Quantum cryptography is one of the very interesting
practical phenomena within quantum information the-
ory [1, 2, 3, 4]. There were in general two ideas to pro-
duce cryptographic key. The first was based on send-
ing nonorthogonal states [5], the second - on specially
chosen measurements of maximally entangled pairs [6].
They have been shown to be equivalent in general [7] in-
cluding most general eavesdropper attack. An important
ingredient of the protocol was so called Quantum Pri-
vacy Amplification [8] based on distillation of EPR paris
[9]. Despite of natural expectations, that distillability
of EPR pairs is a precondition of secure key it has been
recently shown [10, 11] that the class of states which con-
tain ideal key (private states) is much wider than class
of maximally entangled states. It has been shown that
certain bound entangled (BE) states [12] (from which no
EPR pair can be distilled) can be distilled to (approxi-
mate) private states. In other words - surprisingly - there
are bound entangled states with KD > 0.
However the BE states with nonzero distillable key
KD > 0 of Ref. [10, 11] require Hilbert space of quite
large dimension, which makes impression that BE states
useful for cryptography are rather exceptional, and far
from experimental regime. In this paper we provide a
general construction of class of BE states with KD > 0
and give examples of 4 ⊗ 4 states having this property.
To this end we consider binary mixture {p1, p2} of two
orthogonal private bits (private states with at least one
bit of ideal key). We first show that any such non equal
mixture has KD > 0, and can be distilled by - quite re-
markably - one-way Devetak-Winter protocol [13]. Next
we construct special pairs of private bits, and show that
for certain probability their mixture is key distillable and
bound entangled. To obtain this we assure that the state
remains positive (and even invariant) under partial trans-
position (PPT) [14] which is sufficient condition for a
state to be non distillable [12]. We then provide an ex-
ample of the smallest state of our construction which
resides on 4 qubits. Basing on this family of BE key dis-
tillable states we argue, that the volume of BE states with
KD > 0 is nonzero in arbitrary dimension. We exploit
their properties, and consider their experimental prepa-
ration. We then show how to verify that experimentally
prepared state has nonzero distillable key. Finally the
optimal decomposition of observables needed for veryfi-
cation if certain 4⊗ 4 state has KD > 0 is given.
Let us first recall that private bit [11] is a state
γAA′BB′ , where AA
′ is hold by Alice, BB′ by Bob, and
measurement of AB in standard basis provides one bit of
perfect key (ie. possible outcomes are either {00} or {11}
with equal probability 1/2 and they are completely inde-
pendent on measurements on physical system different
than AA′BB′). Following [11] we will write γ in matrix
representation in ABA′B′ order of subsystems, so that
its 4 × 4 structure corresponds to two qubit subsystem
AB.
We shall start the construction of key distillable BE
states by providing a class of states with KD > 0:
Proposition 1 .- Consider two private bits γ1, γ2 and
take any biased mixture of the form:
ρ = p1γ1 + p2σ
A
x γ2σ
A
x (1)
with, say, p1 > p2 and σ
A
x = [σx]A ⊗ IA′BB′ . The distill-
able key KD(ρ) fulfills KD(ρ) ≥ 1− h(p1) where h(p1) is
the binary entropy of distribution {p1, p2}.
Before we prove the proposition, we have to recall a
technique called ”privacy squeezing” [11] that allows to
investigate privacy of states of type ρAA′BB′ . The state
is purified to ψABA′B′E so that Eve holds the subsystem
E of ψ. To draw key, Alice and Bob will measure systems
AB in standard basis, and will process the outcomes by
public discussion. The systems A′B′ will not be actively
used, so the relevant state is
ρ
(ccq)
ABE =
∑
ij
pij |ij〉〈ij|AB ⊗ ρ(ij)E . (2)
where ρijE are Eve’s states given the outcome was ij. The
state is called ccq (two registers are classical). From such
state by Devetak-Winter [13] protocol one can get
KDW = I(A : B)− I(A : E) (3)
2bits of key where I(A : B)ρ = S(A) + S(B) − S(AB),
S(X) being von Neumann entropy of X subsystem of
state ρ. We will now provide a different ccq state σ
(ccq)
ABE ,
which is no better, in the sense that Eve can obtain it
from ρ
(ccq)
ABE by some operation on her system. Clearly,
such σ(ccq) can give no more key than ρ(ccq). The state
σ(ccq) we produce as follows. First, from ρAA′BB′ we
obtain its privacy squeezed (p-squeezed) version σAB. To
this end (i) we apply so-called twisting [10, 11] i.e. a
unitary transformation controlled by standard basis on
AB Uτ =
∑
ij |ij〉〈ij|AB ⊗ U ijA′B′ and subsequently (ii)
we trace over systems A′B′. One finds [10, 11] that p-
squeezed state σAB has a property that the ccq state
σ
(ccq)
ABE emerging after measuring it in standard basis |ij〉
is no better than ρ
(ccq)
ABE . However, if twisting is properly
chosen, then it may still produce much key. The privacy
is now squeezed to solely two systems AB.
Proof of Proposition. Using the above method, we
will apply p-squeezing to the state ρ, and show that from
the σ(ccq) the DW protocol gives 1−h(p1) rate of key. A
basic fact about private bits [10] is that there exists twist-
ing which brings them to the form ψAB0 ⊗ ρ˜A′B′ where
ρ˜A′B′ is some state, ψ0 is one of four Bell states
|ψ0,1〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉) (4)
|ψ2,3〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |01〉) (5)
and in the twisting U01 = U10 = I. Using this, we im-
mediately obtain a twisting which, followed by partial
trace over A′B′, turns the state ρ of eq. (1) into a mix-
ture of ψ0 and ψ2. I.e. the p-squeezed state of (1) is
σAB = p1|ψ0〉〈ψ0|+ p2|ψ2〉〈ψ2|. Its purification is of the
form
ψ′ABE =
√
p1|ψ0〉AB|e1〉E +√p2|ψ2〉AB |e2〉E (6)
so that by measuring it in standard basis Alice and Bob
obtain the ccq state
σ
(ccq)
ABE =
p1
2
[P00 + P11]⊗ Pe1 +
p2
2
[P01 + P10]⊗ Pe2 (7)
with Pij = |ij〉〈ij| and Pei = |ei〉〈ei|. For this state,
we have I(A : B) − I(A : E) = 1 − h(p1) Thus by DW
protocol [13] we get this amount of key. Because this
state is no better than our state of interest ρ
(ccq)
ABE (the
ccq state obtained by measuring AB systems of initial
state ρ) we obtain that the distillable key of ρ satisfies
KD(ρ) ≥ 1− h(p1), which ends the proof of proposition.
Let us note that the key is here drawn by one-way pro-
tocol. We have found that applying two-way recurrence
protocol will not increase the key rate.
Construction of small dimensional bound entangled
states with KD > 0 First let us recall, that any private
bit can be represented in its X-form [11]:
γABA′B′ =
1
2


√
XX† 0 0 X
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
X† 0 0
√
X†X

 (8)
where X is arbitrary operator with trace norm one, and
which completely represents the pbit. Then, we obtain
that state ρ is of the form
ρ =
1
2


p1
√
X1X
†
1 0 0 p1X1
0 p2
√
X2X
†
2 p2X2 0
0 p2X
†
2 p2
√
X†2X2 0
p1X
†
1 0 0 p1
√
X†1X1


.(9)
We assume now that A′ and B′ are systems both de-
scribed by Cd. Now the essential part of the construction
is the following substitution: X1 =
1
||WU ||WU where
WU =
∑
ij
uij |ij〉〈ji| (10)
and uij are unitary matrix elements of some matrix U on
Cd. Note that ||WU || =
∑
ij |uij | (here we use the trace
norm of the matrix). The second operator we choose
X2 =
WΓU
||WΓ
U
|| with Γ being partial transposition on sub-
system B′. In this case one has just ||WΓU || = d
The corresponding mixing probabilities are
p1 =
||WU ||
||WU ||+ ||WΓU ||
p2 =
||WΓU ||
||WU ||+ ||WΓU ||
(11)
respectively.
Collecting two simple observations, namely that: (i)
[WUW
†
U ]
1
2 = [W †UWU ]
1
2 =
∑
ij |uij ||ij〉〈ij| (which af-
ter normalisation by factor ||WU || gives separable, PPT-
invariant state),(ii) [WUW
†
U ]
1
2 = [W †UWU ]
1
2 =
∑
i |ii〉〈ii|,
(again after normalisation giving PPT-invariant separa-
ble state) We get immediately that ρ with parameters
defined like above is PPT invariant. At the same time
we have desired security condition p1 > p2 if only
p1
p2
=
||WU ||
||WΓU ||
≡
∑
ij |uij |
d
> 1. (12)
The latter is satisfied for any unitary U which written in
{|ij〉} basis has more than d nonzero entries.
Thus we have a large class of states that contain secure
key and are at the some time PPT invariant states. Of
course they are entangled since entanglement is a precon-
dition of secure key distillation [15].
Observation 1 The ratio of p1 and p2 in (12) which
is related to KDW key rate achieves the highest value
3for unimodular unitaries U (ie such that |uij | = 1√
d
irrespectively of indices {i, j}). Then it amounts to
[p1
p2
]optimal =
√
d.
Indeed, by use of Lagrange multipliers with slightly
more general constraints
∑
ij |uij |2 = d we get that opti-
mal U is unimodular.
Example of small bound entangled states with KD > 0
on 4 ⊗ 4 system. Putting d = 2 we get the smallest
secure BE states in our construction. An easy example
is a state with U equal to 1-qubit Hadamard gate (H).
Note, that in this case, the state γ2 coincides with the
so called ”flower state” with U = H , which exhibited
locking of entanglement cost [16]. The total state can
be written as a mixture of Bell states on AB subsystem
of state, that are classically correlated with some other
states on A′B′. Namely we have
ρH =
∑
i
qi|ψi〉〈ψi|AB ⊗ ρ(i)A′B′ (13)
where the correlated states are the following:
ρ(0) =
1
2
[P00 + Pψ2 ]
ρ(1) =
1
2
[P11 + Pψ3 ]
ρ(2,3) = Pχ± (14)
with Pψi being projectors onto corresponding Bell states
and Pχ± projectors onto pure states
χ± =
1
2
(
√
2±
√
2 |00〉 ±
√
2∓
√
2 |11〉) (15)
respectively. The mixing distribution {qi}3i=0 is
{ p12 , p12 , p22 , p22 }. Since d = 2, one has p1 =
√
2
1+
√
2
, so
by proposition (1) a positive key rate can be gained from
this 4-qubit PPT state. It reads:
KDWD (ρH) = 1− h(p1) = 0.0213399 (16)
per copy of ρH . Note again, that it automatically means,
that ρH is bound entangled. Indeed we have shown, that
state of that construction is PPT invariant, and it can
not be separable, as it has non-zero distillable key. We
show now the next property of this state.
Observation 2 The state ρH is extremal in the set of
PPT states.
ρH is a mixture of form (9) with X1 =WH and X2 =
XΓ1 . It is straightforward to check, that any mixture with
the weight of γ1 different then value p1 =
√
2
1+
√
2
leads to
NPT state. In fact the same argument proves extremity
of the state from our construction with X =WU , if only
X is hermitian operator, and either X or XΓ has some
positive eigenvalue.
Although the states ρU lay on the edge of the set of
PPT states, basing on this family of states we are able
to show, that the set of PPT key distillable states has
non-zero volume in the set of all PPT 4⊗ 4 states .
Observation 3 The set of PPT distillable key of the
form ρU has nonzero volume in 4⊗ 4.
The proof of this observation bases on the fact, that
Devetak-Winter lower bound (3) is continuous in ρ, as
mutual information is continuous function of ρ. If we
consider now pmixρ + (1 − pmix) I16 , for suitably small
pmix there exists suitably small ǫ > 0 for which the ball
of all states with the center at ρU and radius ǫ lays within
the set of PPT states. By continuity argument, one gets
the thesis. In fact a similar argument gives this result in
any dimension higher than 4⊗ 4.
Upper bound for KD.- Similarly as private bit is ana-
logue of singlet from entanglement distillation theory, the
state ρ of (1) is analogue of mixture of two singlets (which
is actually just the p-squeezed state σ). The distillable
entanglement of the latter state is just 1 − h(p1), [17]
and moreover it is achieved, by coherent application of
the DW protocol. Therefore there is a question, if KD(ρ)
is just equal to 1 − h(p1). In [10, 11] we show that rel-
ative entropy of entanglement Er is an upper bound for
KD. We have analysed the 4⊗4 PPT state ρH , and have
found a separable state which gives Er(ρH) ≤ 0.116.
Preparation of ρU 4 ⊗ 4 states.- As it is shown in ex-
ample (13) ρU 4⊗ 4 states are only classically correlated
along AB versus A′B′ cut. Thus they can be created by
preparing randomly according to {qi} distribution, sepa-
rately two states: a Bell state ψi (for AB subsystem) and
ρ(i) (for A′B′ subsystem). According to observation(2)
ρU lays on the boundary of PPT set, any small pertur-
bation can destroy this property. However in spirit of
observation (3), one can construct PPT states that are
to some extent robust against perturbations.
Key distillability verification for experimentally pre-
pared state.- We now address the question of verifica-
tion whether a state prepared experimentally in many
copies has nonzero distillable key. In the spirit of proof of
the proposition (1) instead of estimating whole ρABA′B′
we suggest to estimate only few parameters of its pri-
vacy squeezed state σAB and subsequently compute some
lower bound on the value of DW rate (3) for the ccq state
σ
(ccq)
ABE of the latter.
Once we do not estimate whole state ρABA′B′ , the for-
mula (3) can not be used directly to decide its quality.
Instead we first consider a lower bound for distillable key
from ccq state. Namely
KD(ρ
(ccq)) ≥ I(A : B)ρ(ccq) − S(E)ρ(ccq) , (17)
which is a consequence of formula (3). Indeed, I(A :
E) for ccq state is equal to S(ρE) −
∑
i piS(ρ
i
E), which
is Holevo function of ansamble {pi, ρiE}. This however
can not be greater then just entropy of Eve’s subsystem
S(ρE) and the assertion follows.
Using this lower bound we provide now the one which
is a function of only diagonal and antidiagonal matrix
elements of (2-qubit) privacy squeezed state σAB . Note,
4that S(σE) = S(σAB), as the total ABE state is pure.
To estimate S(σE) we will consider state σAB subjected
to twirling [9] which projects onto Bell basis. Twirling
can not decrease the entropy, and commutes with mea-
surement in computational basis, so one has that
KD(σ
(ccq)
ABE) ≥ I(A : B)− S(σtwirlAB ) (18)
This is desired lower bound as it is a function of only
those parameters, which we suggest to estimate experi-
mentally.
Although the formula (18) is useful for one-way key
distillable states, knowing the diagonal and antidiagonal
elements of σAB is enough to decide if a two-way recur-
rence protocol can make key rate non-zero.
We give now the observables, which measured on
ρABA′B′ reveals desired elements of its p-squeezed state.
These are:
O1 = U
†
τ [σz ⊗ σz ]AB ⊗ IA′B′Uτ
R1,2 = U
†
τ [Pψ0,2 − Pψ1,3 ]AB ⊗ IA′B′Uτ
I1,2 = U
†
τ [P˜ψ0,2 − P˜ψ1,3 ]AB ⊗ IA′B′Uτ
(19)
where P˜ψk are Bell states with relative phase ±i. The
observable O1 reveals the diagonal elements of state σAB.
In fact, it is just equal to [σz ⊗ σz]AB ⊗ IA′B′ as any
twisting (here U †τ ) commutes with the measurement in
basis which it controls [11]. O1 needs therefore just one
setting. The Rk (Ik) observables reveals real (imaginary)
parts of (possibly complex) coherences on antidiagonal of
σAB . Indeed, one has for example
TrR1ρABA′B′ =
TrU †τ [Pψ0 − Pψ1 ]AB ⊗ IA′B′UτρABA′B′ =
Tr[Pψ0 − Pψ1 ]AB ⊗ IA′B′UτρABA′B′U †τ =
Tr[Pψ0 − Pψ1 ]TrA′B′ [UτρABA′B′U †τ ] =
Tr[Pψ0 − Pψ1 ]σAB . (20)
where second equality is by property of trace, and third
by definition of subsystem of a quantum state. Last
equality uses definition of privacy squeezed state (σAB)
which is obtained by acting on ρABA′B′ with some twist-
ing Uτ and tracing out A
′B′ subsystem.
Local decomposition of verification observables for ρH .
In case of ρH twisting which realises privacy squeezing is
equal to:
Uτ = |00〉〈00|⊗WH+|01〉〈01|⊗PH+(|10〉〈10|+|11〉〈11|)⊗I
(21)
where by PH =
∑1
ij=0 hij |ii〉〈jj| +
∑
i6=j |ij〉〈ij| for hij
elements of Hadamard and WH = P
Γ
H . For this Uτ , the
observables R1 and I1 can be decomposed into Pauli op-
erators {I, σx, σy , σz} in the following way:
R1 =
1
4
[σx ⊗ σx − σy ⊗ σy ]AB ⊗
⊗ [(I ⊗ σz + σz ⊗ I) + (σx ⊗ σx + σy ⊗ σy)]A′B′
I1 = −1
4
[σx ⊗ σy + σy ⊗ σx]AB ⊗
⊗ [(I ⊗ σz + σz ⊗ I) + (σx ⊗ σx + σy ⊗ σy)]A′B′
and the same for R2 and I2, which read
R2 =
1
4
[σx ⊗ σx + σy ⊗ σy]AB ⊗ [(I ⊗ I − σz ⊗ σz) +
1√
2
((I ⊗ σz + σz ⊗ I) + (σx ⊗ σx + σy ⊗ σy))]A′B′
I2 = −1
4
[σy ⊗ σx − σx ⊗ σy]AB ⊗ [(I ⊗ I − σz ⊗ σz) +
1√
2
((I ⊗ σz + σz ⊗ I) + (σx ⊗ σx + σy ⊗ σy))]A′B′
Generalizing approach for two-qubit case of [18, 19] to
four qubit case, one can easily show, that decomposition
for R2 and I2 is optimal in the sense, that it needs 6
settings. The set of these 6 collective settings is enough
for both R2, I2 and R1, I1 (for the latter it needs only
different classical post-processing). Since this set of set-
tings is optimal for determining R2, I2 and suffices for
determining all Ri, Ii, we conclude, that it is optimal for
our task. Together with one setting for O1 one needs 7
different collective settings to verify via lower bound (18)
if the state ρH has non zero distillable key.
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